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ABSTRACT 
 
Stock options represent an increasingly significant component of executive compensation. 
Theoretically, the inclusion of stock options in executive compensation contracts motivates 
managers to take actions that increase the market value of the firm's stock. Accounting 
standards regulating the treatment of stock options continue to be controversial. The focus 
of this paper is to examine the accounting treatment of stock options. We begin by 
outlining the controversial history of accounting for stock options.  Next, we examine the 
alternative accounting treatments for stock option.  Finally, we critique the proposed 
changes to the methods of accounting for stock options. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
tock options represent an increasingly significant component of executive compensation.  Recent surveys 
show that CEOs receive between 60 and 80 percent of their total compensation from stock options 
(Business Week 2000, Henry et al. 2002,).  Theoretically, the inclusion of stock options in executive 
compensation contracts motivates managers to take actions that increase the market value of the firm's stock.  
Specifically, stock options tie compensation to stock price; when executives engage in actions which increase stock 
price, their compensation increases.  Thus, stock options help to align the goals of management with the goals of the 
firm's stockholders.  
 
Accounting standards regulating the treatment of stock options continue to be controversial.
1
 Prior to 1995, 
accounting for stock options was governed by APB Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees (APB 
25).  Under APB 25, compensation expense from stock options occurred only when options had intrinsic value: that is 
when the market price at the measurement date, usually the date of grant, exceeded the exercise price of the options.   
In October 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 123, Accounting for Stock Based Compensation (SFAS 123).  The standard required the disclosure of 
the fair market value of stock options granted in executive compensation packages. With the devastating impact of 
recent accounting scandals, the original debates have been even more vigorously rekindled.  The FASB has recently 
issued an exposure draft which will potentially require expense treatment for stock options.   
  
The focus of this paper is to examine the accounting treatment of stock options. We begin by outlining the 
controversial history of accounting for stock options.  Next, we examine the alternative financial reporting treatments 
for stock options under U.S. accounting standards.  Finally, we will identify advantages and disadvantages of the 
Exposure Draft treatment of stock options.    
 
                                                          
1 Street, Fordham and Waylan (1997) document the controversy surrounding stock options through an analysis of newspaper and business magazine 
articles between 1975-1993. 
 
S 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF STOCK OPTIONS 
 
The use of stock options was necessitated by separation of company ownership and management, which 
became common as companies grew large during the industrial revolution. By the 1920s, many formerly family-run 
enterprises were being run by professional managers.  After the Great Depression, many people were left analyzing 
what had gone wrong with capitalism.  Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, loyal New Dealers, ―argued that the rise of 
professional managers had given business executives de facto power to appropriate shareholder assets…[but] the way 
to save capitalism…was not to bar managers from pursuing their own interests but to regulate their doing so‖ (Shapiro 
2002, p. 2).    
 
This became the basis of what is now referred to as the agency problem. The agency problem: how to get a 
manager (agent) to act in the best interest of shareholder-owners (principal) when the agent has both more information 
and different interests than the principal.  The use of compensatory stock options provide a potential solution to this 
problem.  A stock option gives managers the right to purchase common stock at a specific price over an extended 
period of time.  Most people believe that if the company succeeds, the market price of the stock will increase.  
Therefore, the company’s success is directly related to the manager’s compensation.  This helps motivate managers to 
take actions that maximize firm value and thus their compensation.  
 
Recognition of the ability of stock options to mitigate the agency problem has increased their popularity.  
Stock options began to appear modestly in the 1950s, but their popularity began to grow quickly in the 1970s.  By 
1980, 30% of top managers were receiving stock options, and by 1994, 70% were. By 2000 top managers were 
receiving stock options, often amounting to $30 to $55 million a year. The appropriate method of accounting for stock 
options has grown in importance as the use of stock options as a component of executive compensation has increased. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 The prevalent theory is that stock options represent an operating cost to the company, a form of 
compensation.  Therefore, to be consistent with the conceptual framework of the FASB, the cost of this type of 
compensation should be reflected in the income statement and matched against the benefits over the employee service 
period.  
 
In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees,  
defined a way to account for stock options.  Under APB 25, compensation expense related to stock options was 
recognized only when such plans had intrinsic value (i.e., if the market price was higher than the exercise price).  
Since the exercise price was typically fixed at the market price on the grant date, compensation expense was seldom 
recognized under option plans.   
 
Because of perceived shortcomings of APB 25, the FASB added a project to its agenda to reexamine stock 
option accounting in 1984.  Between 1985 and 1988, the FASB conducted research on various aspects of stock based 
compensation plans.  Tentative conclusions, reported in the FASB’s Weekly Action Alert, implied that the FASB 
would require companies to expense the fair value of stock options.  Expensing of stock options was criticized by 
many companies, especially high technology companies in Silicon Valley, who argued that they would have to 
eliminate stock options if expensing was required by FASB. During Board deliberations from 1985 to 1988, more 
than 200 letters were received that commented on, and usually objected to, the tentative conclusions reported in the 
Action Alert (SFAS 123, par. 368).   
 
Later, in June 1992, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the FASB had begun a project to examine 
accounting for stock options (Carlson 1992).  Accounting for stock based compensation was addressed at nineteen 
public board meetings and at two public task force meetings in 1992 and 1993.  Again, the tentative conclusion from 
these meetings to expense stock options was reported in the Action Alert.  During this time period, the FASB received 
more than 450 comment letters, most of which objected to the tentative conclusion (SFAS 123, par. 374).  On June 30, 
1993, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft on accounting for stock options that required firms to expense the fair value 
of the options. On May 3, 1994, the U.S. Senate debated a private sector external financial reporting accounting 
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standard for the first time in history. After debating, they passed a non-binding resolution, 88 to 9, expressing 
opposition to the FASB’s proposal (Rubinstein 1995). In total, the FASB received 1,786 comment letters, including 
1,000 form letters, most of which objected to the Exposure Draft (SFAS 123, par. 376).   
 
Opponents argued that adoption of the Exposure Draft as the final standard would cause the elimination of stock 
options from compensation packages.  Their main concern was that companies’ earnings per share (EPS) would be 
significantly reduced by recognizing the extra expense, thus hurting their stock prices. This new method would 
specifically hurt the financial results of start-up technology companies, which used stock option compensation as a 
way to lure talented executives to run their companies. In fact, recent findings show that the net income of Standard & 
Poor's 500 companies would decline 9% for the year 2000 if an expense were recorded for the fair value of stock 
options granted (Gleckman 2002). 
 
Under intense criticism from many parties, including Congress and the SEC, and apprehensive about the 
federal government assuming control of accounting standard setting, the FASB changed the proposed standard. SFAS 
123 gives firms the option of expensing the fair value of options in the income statement or applying APB 25 with fair 
value information disclosed in the footnotes.  While the FASB prefers that firms actually expense the fair value of 
options, this methodology is rarely used because of the significant effect of this expense on net income.  Thus, in 
practice, most firms continue to apply APB 25.  Option price is typically set equal to or greater than the market price 
at the grant date, allowing firms to avoid reporting any income statement expense for options.  Pro forma income and 
earnings per share reflecting the fair market value of stock options as an expense are disclosed in the footnotes of the 
financial statements.    
 
The controversy surrounding the accounting treatment of stock options has recently received renewed interest in 
the news media.  Enron, among many other companies, was able to boost its income by not expensing stock options 
granted to employees. Former CEO Kenneth Lay received $123.4 million from exercising his options in 2000 (Barlas 
2002).  Many argue that the inappropriate application of accounting standards by Enron was a result of upper 
management’s desire to increase share prices through misstatement of financial information.  Occurrences of financial 
statement fraud have been found to damage the perceived usefulness of disclosures (Nagy 2001).   
 
In response to the renewed media interest, Congress, government officials and business leaders have taken an 
active interest in the accounting treatment of stock options. Some companies have taken a tougher stance on stock 
options accounting since the recent accounting scandals have occurred in an attempt to increase investor confidence in 
their stock.  Coca-Cola was one of the first companies to change its accounting method, in July of 2002, from the 
intrinsic value method to the fair value method and began to recognize stock option expense.  
 
Recently, on March 12, 2003, the FASB announced in a news release the addition of a project that will seek 
improved financial accounting disclosures of stock-based compensation.  This new project will also discuss whether 
to require companies to expense stock options as opposed to continuing to offer the two different methods allowed in 
SFAS 123.  The project will look into finding better ways to measure stock options expense and the need for one 
method of accounting for stock options for purposes of consistent financial data (FASB 2003).   
 
On March 21, 2004 the FASB released a new Exposure Draft on stock options entitled ―Share-Based 
Payment—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 123 and 95.‖  This Exposure Draft requires expense treatment for 
compensatory stock options.  As has been the case in the past, this proposed standard has been the subject of intense 
debate.  During the comment period, the FASB received 6,534 letters on the proposed standard, mostly opposing 
expense treatment for stock options.  In the next section of the paper, we provide a detailed outline of the standard.   
 
THE EXPOSURE DRAFT ON STOCK OPTIONS 
 
In this section of the paper, we examine the recently issued FASB exposure draft concerning the accounting 
for share-based payments.  In particular, liabilities and equity obligations incurred as a result of issuing equity 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April 2005                                                             Volume 3, Number 4 
34 
instruments with forward looking consequences as compensation to employees for services rendered is the focus of 
this manuscript (FASB 2004, par. 5).
2
  
 
The primary provision of the Exposure Draft requires that ―Public entities should measure the cost of 
employee services received in exchange for awards of equity instruments based on the fair value of the instruments at 
the grant date‖ (FASB 2004, par. 6).  In addition, some awards may be classified as liabilities, while most are 
classified as equity. ―This statement requires that the cost resulting from all share-based payment transactions be 
recognized in the financial statements.‖ (FASB 2004, Appendix A, par. 1) This, of course assumes that such 
transactions are costs, and a primary question is, which stakeholders suffer these costs?  Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises (CONS #1), specifies 
investors and creditors as the primary beneficiaries of external financial reporting.  
 
In some cases, equity instruments granted become liabilities as required under SFAS #150. When an 
employee could terminate service and retain the fair value of the instrument that is mandatorially redeemable by the 
entity, a liability for the instrument fair value is recorded. It is remeasured at the end of each period until it is settled.  
 
On the stock option grant date, the option is assigned a fair value based on the market value of a similar 
option if one is available. Otherwise, a calculation using an option-pricing model, which takes into account various 
factors
3
, should be used. The exposure draft encourages, but does not propose to require, use of the so called lattice 
model, or secondarily the Black-Scholes-Merton formula. The measurement process establishes the fair value of the 
equity instruments granted to employees. Compensation expense in the amount of the fair value is recognized in the 
income statement as employees render services.  
 
To show a simple example, assume Bauer Company begins business by issuing 100,000 shares of $1 par 
value stock for $100,000. Immediately, the board of directors grants 100,000 options to the company officers who are 
employees. The exercise price for the shares is $1 per share; they vest ratably over the next five years, and are 
excisable for 10 years from the grant date. The option value is determined to be $.50 per share.
4
 Each year, the 
company generates $25,000 in sales, and the only expense is $10,000 compensation associated with the vesting 
options (100,000 x $.50 = $50,000 x 1/5 = $10,000). Each year, the options are exercised on the last day of the year. 
The income statements for the 5 years and the balance sheet for the fifth year are shown in Exhibit 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Other issues addressed in the exposure draft, such as small business issues, cash flow reporting, graded vesting, modifications of awards, 
replacement awards, etc. are beyond the scope of this paper.  
3 The valuation model should take into account, at a minimum: a. the exercise price of the option, b. the expected term of the option, taking into 
account both the contractual term of the option and the effects of employees’ expected exercise and post-vesting employment terminations 
behavior, c. the current price of the underlying share, d. the expected volatility of the price of the underlying share, e. the expected dividends on the 
underlying share, f. the risk-free interest rate for he expected term of the option.  
4 The value of the options is proportional to the example found in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the exposure draft.  
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EXHIBIT 1: Granted Options Are Exercised 
 
Bauer Company 
Income Statements 
For the years ended 20X1-20X5 
 
     20X1    20X2     20X3     20X4   20X5 
Sales   $25,000  $25,000  $25,000  $25,000          $25,000 
Compensation  
   Expense    10,000   10,000   10,000      10,000            10,000 
Net Income  $15,000                  $15,000                $15,000    $15,000               $15,000 
 
Earnings per share      $.15    $.125       $.107        $.094       $.083 
Shares outstanding  100,000                120,000                140,000   160,000        180,000                     
 
Bauer Company 
Balance sheet 
12/31/X5 
 
Cash  $325,000  Common stock      $200,000 
      Paid-in capital –  
        Stock options                    50,000 
           Retained earnings        75,000 
Total Assets $325,000  Liabilities and equity  $325,000 
 
Over the five years the book value of the company rose from $1.00 per share to $1.63 per share. The net 
income for the five year period, however, totaled only $.48. The net income including the charge for employee stock 
options granted does not appear to reflect economic reality.  
 
If the market price of the stock remained below the exercise price, and the options were never exercised, then 
the results are as shown in Exhibit 2.  
 
EXHIBIT 2: Granted Options Are Not Exercised 
 
Bauer Company 
Income Statements 
For the years ended 20X1-20X5 
 
     20X1    20X2     20X3     20X4    20X5 
Sales    $25,000  $25,000   $25,000  $25,000          $25,000 
Compensation  
   Expense     10,000     10,000       10,000      10,000    10,000 
Net Income   $15,000                $15,000   $15,000  $15,000         $15,000 
 
Earnings per share          $.15      $.15         $.15     $.15      $.15 
Shares outstanding   100,000                100,000   100,000   100,000        100,000                     
 
Bauer Company 
Balance sheet 
12/31/X5 
 
Cash  $225,000  Common stock   $100,000 
      Paid-in capital –  
        Stock options     100,000 
           Retained earnings          25,000 
Total Assets $225,000  Liabilities and equity  $225,000 
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Over the five years the book value of the company rose from $1.00 per share to $2.25 per share. The net 
income for the five year period, however, totaled only $.60. The net income including the charge for employee stock 
options granted does not appear to reflect economic reality.  We see that the effect of charging option values as 
compensation expense is that earnings are merely being capitalized into paid-in capital. This is the same action as a 
stock dividend.  
 
Contrast the above example with an example of stock issued in order to acquire a depreciable asset. Then the 
cost of that asset is properly depreciated in order to assess the recovery of the cost to provide for the orderly 
replacement of the asset. Stock issued for employee compensation carries no such future implication.  It is a period 
event. The income statements for the 5 years and balance sheet for the fifth year are provided in Exhibit 3.  
 
 
EXHIBIT 3: Equipment Depreciated Over Its Useful Life 
 
Bauer Company 
Income Statements 
For the years ended 20X1-20X5 
 
     20X1    20X2     20X3     20X4  20X5 
Sales   $25,000  $25,000  $25,000  $25,000                $25,000 
Depreciation  
   Expense    20,000      20,000     20,000      20,000                20,000 
Net Income    $5,000      $5,000      $5,000      $5,000                $5,000 
 
Earnings per share         $.05       $.05          $.05       $.05                   $.05 
Shares outstanding  100,000   100,000  100,000  100,000                 100,000                     
 
Bauer Company 
Balance sheet 
12/31/X5 
 
Cash  $125,000  Common stock   $100,000 
      Paid-in capital –  
Equipment   100,000     Stock options       
Accum. Depr  (100,000)  Retained earnings           25,000 
Total Assets $125,000  Liabilities and equity  $125,000 
 
 
Over the five years the book value of the company rose from $1.00 per share to $1.25 per share. The net 
income for the five year period totaled $.25. The net income including the charge for depreciation does appear to 
reflect economic reality. The charge for depreciation is an allocation to represent the using up of an asset. It bears no 
resemblance to a dividend.  
 
SHARE APPRECIATION RIGHTS (SARS)  
 
Share appreciation rights (SARS) are equity instruments granted to employees that carry the promise to pay 
in cash the SARS value upon exercise of the SARS by the employee. Like stock options granted, compensation 
expense is recognized over the SARS vesting period. Unlike the expense for stock options granted, however, the 
expense/liability for cash settlement is accrued each period using fair value of the SARS.  
 
Using the example from above, assume that the fair value of the SARS (market price of stock – exercise 
price) at December 31 each year is as provided in Panel A of Exhibit 4.  
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EXHIBIT 4: SARS Are Granted 
 
Panel A: Fair Value of SARS 
 
   20X1    20X2     20X3     20X4   20X5 
     $.05      $.20       $.15       $.30      $.60 
 
 
Panel B: Financial Statements 
 
Bauer Company 
Income Statements 
For the years ended 20X1-20X5 
 
     20X1    20X2     20X3     20X4   20X5 
Sales   $25,000  $25,000  $25,000  $25,000          $25,000 
Compensation  
   Expense      1,000          7,000          1,000      15,000    36,000 
Net Income  $24,000  $18,000  $24,000  $10,000         (11,000) 
 
Earnings per share     $.24        $.18         $.24      $.10      ($.11) 
Shares outstanding 100,000    100,000  100,000  100,000          100,000                     
 
Bauer Company 
Balance sheet 
12/31/X5 
 
Cash  $165,000  Common stock    $100,000 
      Paid-in capital –  
        Stock options     0 
           Retained earnings       65,000 
Total Assets $165,000  Liabilities and equity   $165,000 
 
 
The expense for 20X1 then would be $1,000 (100,000 x $.05 x 1/5). The debit to compensation is offset with 
a credit to a liability account, such as share-based compensation liability. In the second year the liability rises to 
$8,000 (100,000 x $.20 x 2/5). An additional $7,000 is charged to expense. At the end of 20X3, the liability stands at 
$9,000 (100,000 x $.15 x 3/5). An additional $1,000 is charged to expense. At the end of 20X4 the liability rises to 
$24,000 (100,000 x $.30 x 4/5). An additional $15,000 is charged to expense. Finally, at the end of the vesting period 
the liability is $60,000 (100,000 x $.60 x 1), and an additional $36,000 is charged to compensation expense. The 
financial statements prepared under this assumption are provided in Panel B of Exhibit 4.  
 
This result is appealing because it reflects economic reality. The company incurred a $60,000 liability and 
paid it off with assets of the company.  
 
CRITIQUE OF EXPOSURE DRAFT AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The Exposure Draft states that, ―The objective of accounting for transactions under share-based payment 
arrangements with employees is to recognize as an expense in the income statement the cost to the entity of services 
received (and consumed) in exchange for equity instruments issued, or liabilities incurred.‖ The Exposure Draft 
specifies that the compensation cost is determined by the fair value of the equity instruments issued. It does not allow 
for the alternative use of fair value of services provided if that is more clearly determinable. The fair value of the 
equity instruments is charged to expense over the requisite service period as services are rendered. The fair value of 
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the equity instrument awarded shall not be remeasured after the grant date. We see in the exhibits that the proposed 
expensing of share-based payments often does not reflect economic reality. Sometimes, we have zero dollars and zero 
equity interests involved; nevertheless, we have a decrement to the corporation that affects bond holders and 
stockholders equally. Preposterous. When is the incidence of expense? Is there an expense or is the award a dividend? 
We believe that it is more like a stock dividend with conditions.  
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